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  n November 19, 2019, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine 
signed a presidential decree authorizing his government to sign the Safe 
Schools Declaration (SSD).1 Ukraine’s endorsement was formally confirmed 
by the Minister of Education in Kyiv the following day, the thirtieth anni-
versary of the signing of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.2 Ukraine was the one-hundredth State to register its support for 
the SSD.3 Just six months later, on May 29, 2020, in a resolution proposed 
by Qatar, sponsored by almost fifty other States, and adopted by consensus, 
the UN General Assembly declared that September 9 would in the future be 
designated the International Day for the Protection of Education from At-
tack.4 The first of these days was marked on September 9, 2020, and the 
following day the UN Security Council convened an open debate about at-
tacks on schools as a grave violation of children’s rights.5 These events are 
notable indicators of the significant influence the SSD has managed to garner 
in the relatively brief period since its launch at an all-States diplomatic con-
ference hosted by Norway in Oslo in May 2015. 
In less than five years, the SSD has attracted formal individual-State en-
dorsements from over half of all UN member States, including two of the 
permanent members of the Security Council (France and the United King-
dom).6 While not yet universal, this formal support is global in reach and, as 
the May 2020 General Assembly resolution demonstrates, is certainly 
                                                                                                                      
1. Safe Schools Declaration, https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/docu-
ments/documents_safe_schools_declaration-final.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2021). 
2. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
UNCRC].  
3. Safe Schools Declaration Endorsements, GCPEA, https://ssd.protectingeducation.org/ 
endorsement/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2021). Norway is the depository State for endorsements 
of the SSD.  
4. G.A. Res. 74/275 (May 29, 2020). 
5. For a recording of that debate, see Children and Armed Conflict: Attacks against Schools 




vents&sort=date [hereinafter Open Debate]. 
6. In November 2020, Ghana became the 106th State to endorse. See Safe Schools Decla-













globally influential. By the end of 2020, while most Asian States had yet to 
indicate their support,7 most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope, and African Union States had endorsed the SSD, as had most Ameri-
can States.8 Nigeria will host the fourth safe schools conference in 2021, 
continuing a biennial tradition initiated by Norway in 2015 and firmly estab-
lished by Argentina in 2017 and Spain in 2019. 
Such rapidly achieved general support for an international instrument, 
while not unprecedented, is certainly notable. It is particularly so because the 
SSD was drafted at the State level for the purpose of advancing a set of 
international guidelines that were, for the most part, a civil society initiative. 
The heart of the SSD is a set of International Guidelines for the Protection 
of Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict;9 the 
SSD’s purpose has been to provide the diplomatic vehicle for obtaining in-
ternational support for them. 
Conceived in 2012, developed and published by the summer of 2013, the 
Guidelines were incorporated in the SSD in early 2015, just in time for the 
Oslo Safe Schools Conference hosted by the Norwegian government in May 
2015.10 Since then, the SSD has been available for formal endorsement by 
States, as well as used by armed non-State actors (ANSAs).11 The act of en-
dorsing the SSD has the effect of formally registering support for the Guide-
lines. State-endorsement obviously indicates “verbal” support, but of much 
greater significance and importance would be evidence that the Guidelines 
are being implemented—by both States and ANSAs—and are having a pos-
itive effect during current armed conflicts. This seems now to be the case, 
                                                                                                                      
7. At the time of writing, only two of the ten Association of South East Asian States 
members had endorsed the SSD (Malaysia and Viet Nam). See id. 
8. The notable American exception is the United States. Although it has not formally 
endorsed the SSD, it has not raised objections to it and the author is not aware of any 
evidence that U.S. military forces have acted in a manner inconsistent with the SSD.  
9. For the text, see Part VII infra. 
10. For a comprehensive account of the drafting of the SSD and advocacy associated 
with it, see Article36, Reflections from the Safe Schools Declaration Process For Future International 
Political Commitments On Civilian Protection (2019), https://article36.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2019/08/SSD-process-reflections.pdf [hereinafter Reflections from the Safe Schools Dec-
laration Process]. 
11. States notify the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of their endorsement of 
the SSD and the Guidelines therein; until now ANSAs have also been able to indicate their 














with evidence of application beginning to emerge, at least in prima facie 
terms.12 There is, therefore, a significant story to be told of a successful pro-
cess involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies, 
together with engagement by the foreign ministries and armed forces of over 
a hundred States.13 Since State endorsements have passed into three figures, 
now seems to be an appropriate time to tell it. 
This article recounts the narrative of the development of the Guidelines, 
between the formation of the Global Coalition to Protect Education from 
Attack (GCPEA or Global Coalition) and the formal launch of their final 
text in December 2014; it includes discussion of the legal and policy factors 
considered in their development. After describing the background, it com-
ments on the strategic importance of education including from a military-
strategic perspective. This is followed by an explanation of the relevant pro-
visions of international human rights law (IHRL) and international humani-
tarian law/law of armed conflict (IHL/LOAC) applying to education in 
armed conflict. It then explains what is meant by “military use” and why this 
became the focus of a concerted campaign mounted by civil society organi-
zations and UN agencies. Next, it describes how the Guidelines were devel-
oped between May 2012 and July 2013 and the methodology behind their 
preparation. We include the Guidelines’ text, briefly describe the SSD’s pro-
gress, and deal with implementation and monitoring before describing their 
impact and drawing some conclusions.   
It is important to mention that the author was responsible for drafting 
the Guidelines and remains actively engaged with their advocacy. Therefore, 
the article is a personal account of the thinking behind the Guidelines and 
                                                                                                                      
12. For an update on the practical impact of the SSD, see Global Coalition to Protect 
Education from Attack, Fact Sheet: Practical Impact of the Safe Schools Declaration 3 (2019), 
http://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/docu-
ments_ssd_fact_sheet_october_2019.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet: Practical Impact of the Safe 
Schools Declaration]; see also Bede Sheppard, Keeping Schools Safe from the Battlefield: Why Global 
Legal and Policy Efforts to Deter the Military Use of Schools Matter, 101 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
OF THE RED CROSS 665, 680–83 (2019). 
13. ANSAs, while not directly engaged in the process, have been “represented” by the 













their development, and by no means an entirely objective critique;14 that will 




The story of the Guidelines can be traced back to 2003 and 2005. Zama 
Neff, of the Children’s Rights Division of Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
paid two visits to Afghanistan during which she became seriously concerned 
about attacks on schools and the reasons behind them. HRW published her 
reports on the visits in 2006.16 Data she had gathered informed the first edi-
tion of Education Under Attack,17 a report on the vulnerability of education 
compiled and published in 2007 by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO). Two years later, in 2009, Neff’s HRW col-
league Bede Sheppard visited areas affected by the Maoist conflict in India 
and, in 2010, visited the area of the separatist conflict in southern Thailand, 
observing the effects of military forces using schools in both countries.18 He 
realized that this rendered schools especially vulnerable to attack from op-
posing military forces, placing children and teachers at serious risk as a con-
sequence. Even if children and staff were not present when attacks were 
mounted, school buildings themselves would be at risk of damage or de-
struction, despite ordinarily qualifying as civilian objects immune from at-
tack. If military forces were present within them, thereby compromising their 
civilian status, attacks on schools would not necessarily be unlawful under 
                                                                                                                      
14. The author invited and received comment on an advanced draft of the article from 
the following colleagues with whom he worked closely on the Guidelines project: Ms. 
Courtney Erwin (formerly with Education Above All); Mr. Bede Sheppard (Deputy Head, 
Children’s Rights Division, Human Rights Watch); Ms. Veronique Aubert (Save the Chil-
dren, (UK)); and Ms. Zama Neff (Head, Children’s Rights Division, Human Rights Watch). 
The usual caveat applies, of course: their comments have much improved the quality of the 
article and any remaining errors, omissions, and opinions expressed remain entirely the au-
thor’s responsibility. 
15. The Guidelines have been subject to academic comment previously. See Ashley Fer-
relli, Military Use of Educational Facilities during Armed Conflict: An Evaluation of the Guidelines for 
Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict as an Effective Solution, 44 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 339 (2016).  
16. See Human Rights Watch, Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan (2006), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/afghanistan0706brochure.pdf.  
17. MARK RICHMOND, EDUCATION UNDER ATTACK 2007 (2007).  
18. See JO BECKER, CAMPAIGNING FOR CHILDREN: STRATEGIES FOR ADVANCING 













IHL/LOAC. Of course, any damage to schools would seriously undermine 
the ability of States to deliver education, but the destruction of schools would 
completely deprive children of their right to education. Sheppard’s logical 
conclusion was that a reduction in the military use of schools could have the 
positive effect of enhancing their protection in general.   
Continuing research by Neff and Sheppard fed into the second edition 
of Education Under Attack,19 published by UNESCO in 2010. Before that re-
port’s publication, UNESCO, with financial backing from Qatar and the 
Doha-based foundation, Education Above All, had convened an expert 
workshop in Paris between September 28 and October 1, 2009, to discuss 
the vulnerability of schools in conflict zones and what action might be taken 
to enhance their security. Both Neff and Sheppard presented at the Paris 
workshop, as did U.S. Navy Commander Gregory Bart, whose paper re-
viewed the legal framework for the protection of educational facilities. This 
prompted some consideration of how legal protections could be enhanced, 
with Education Above All seeing this as having scope for development.20 
Following the Paris workshop, a particularly significant development was the 
proposal, strongly supported by UNESCO, to form an international coali-
tion to work towards the protection of schools and universities during armed 
conflict. The result was GCPEA. The evidence of the effects of military use 
of educational facilities was influential in shaping the Global Coalition’s mis-
sion once it was established in 2010. Reducing the military use of schools 
became one of its major objectives. It has been campaigning for this ever 
since.  
The participation of UN agencies has, from the outset, been crucial to 
giving GCPEA’s work a measure of international legitimacy. Of these agen-
cies, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has been the most 
prominent within the Global Coalition, being extremely active in advocacy. 
Otherwise, GCPEA’s work has been driven by the civil society organizations 
                                                                                                                      
19. BRENDAN O’MALLEY, EDUCATION UNDER ATTACK 2010 (2010). 
20. For the proceedings of the Paris workshop, see PROTECTING EDUCATION FROM 
ATTACK: A STATE-OF-THE-ART REVIEW (UNESCO ed., 2010), https://unesdoc.unesco. 
org/ark:/48223/pf0000186732. In particular, see Zama Coursen- Neff, Attacks on Education: 
Monitoring and Reporting for Prevention, Early Warning Rapid Response and Accountability, id. at 111; 
Bede Sheppard, Painful and Inconvenient: Accountability for Attacks on Education, id. at 125; Greg-
ory Raymond Bart, Ambiguous Protection of Schools under the Law of War: Time for Parity with 













involved.21 A key NGO at the outset was the Qatar-based Education Above 
All, strongly supported by Sheikha Moza bint Nasser, the consort of the 
then-Emir of Qatar and UNESCO’s Special Envoy for Basic and Higher 
Education.22 The most notable and actively involved NGOs throughout 
GCPEA’s existence have been Education Above All (which was not only 
instrumental in initiating the process but also provided the bulk of the fund-
ing for GCPEA), together with HRW and Save the Children. The Global 
Coalition has been chaired jointly by Zama Neff from HRW and Veronique 
Aubert of Save the Children (UK). Its headquarters are in New York, but a 
significant amount of advocacy work is run out of Save the Children Inter-
national’s office in Geneva (with access to the UN human rights bodies and 
to State missions to the United Nations) and Save the Children (UK)’s Lon-
don office.  
Since 2010, GCPEA’s purpose has been to take the lead in the coordi-
nation of data collection and reporting and raise global awareness of the sit-
uation and pursue ways of protecting education in zones of armed conflict. 
The Coalition’s first task was to build on the previous UNESCO studies, 
inheriting responsibility for producing subsequent Education Under Attack re-
ports. Extensive data gathering proceeded between 2010 and 2012, and 
GCPEA’s first report was published in 2014.23  
In the years under scrutiny, attacks on education had occurred in at least 
seventy States worldwide. The 2014 GCPEA report profiled thirty of those 
States in which the most serious incidents occurred, including direct attacks 
                                                                                                                      
21. Since its establishment in 2010, GCPEA has been governed by a steering committee 
that has included UNICEF; UNESCO; the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; the 
Council for At-Risk Academics (CARA), which has since withdrawn; HRW; the Institute of 
International Education Scholar Rescue Fund; Plan International; Protect Education in In-
security and Conflict (PEIC), a program of the Qatar-based Education Above All Founda-
tion; and Save the Children. See Who We Are, GCPEA, https://protectingeducation. 
org/about-us/who-we-are/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).   
22. Sheikha Moza is especially associated with the provision of education and social 
reform, both in Qatar and internationally. This led to her being awarded the Chatham House 
Prize by the London-based Royal Institute of International Affairs in 2007. The Education 
Above All Foundation was her initiative and received significant funding from the govern-
ment of Qatar. Her role within UNESCO was especially influential in relation to the found-
ing of GCPEA and the initiation of the guidelines project.  
23. GLOBAL COALITION TO PROTECT EDUCATION FROM ATTACK, EDUCATION UN-














on schools or the killing of students, teachers, or academics. To quote from 
the report: 
 
Many attacks involve bombing or burning of schools or universities, or 
killing, injuring or kidnapping, or illegally arresting, detaining or torturing 
students, teachers and academics. Hundreds have died as a result and hun-
dreds of thousands more have missed out on the right to education. In 
many places, children and young people, and those who teach them, live in 
fear of attacks.24 
 
As the data were being gathered and analyzed, GCPEA’s members had 
to identify what the NGOs could do to contribute to mitigating the worst 
effects of conflict on education. Publicizing the problem was all well and 
good and achieved one of the Global Coalition’s stated goals, but the ulti-
mate aim had to be to make a positive difference “on the ground” in zones 
of conflict. This would most certainly involve enhancing compliance with 
existing law and strengthening norms and standards, as well as ensuring ac-
countability and countering impunity when the law is breached.25 This was 
unlikely to be easily achieved.  
In extreme circumstances, schools have been badly damaged or de-
stroyed as a deliberate policy, with staff and pupils injured or killed in the 
process. As HRW has noted: 
 
Both armed non-state groups and national military and security forces are 
attacking education to advance their own interests, the Global Coalition 
said. They may be retaliating against a community’s perceived support for 
the opposition; seeking to demonstrate a lack of government control by 
harming schools and teachers, symbols of the state; . . . or opposing the 
spread of ideas deemed to be objectionable, such as the education of girls.  
 
Often, sectarian violence is fought out in the schoolyard. In March 2013, a 
mob of 200 Buddhist nationalists torched a Muslim school in Meiktila, My-
anmar, clubbing students, setting them on fire, and decapitating one. In 
total, 32 students and four teachers were killed.26 
                                                                                                                      
24. Id. at 8. 
25. GLOBAL COALITION TO PROTECT EDUCATION FROM ATTACK, EDUCATION UN-
DER ATTACK 2020, at 75–79 (2020). 














Unfortunately, there are many examples of both State authorities and 
ANSAs driven by extreme ideologies and political, sectarian, or religious 
views, deliberately targeting education facilities, students, and teachers, the 
Taliban in Afghanistan and Boko Haram in Nigeria being infamous exam-
ples. Realistically, verbal advocacy efforts by civil society organizations to 
persuade such groups to abandon the very core of their beliefs and motives 
and significantly change their behavior are unlikely to prove productive. In 
fact, that is an understatement. In dealing with such cases, the focus almost 
certainly needs to include the physical and forceful prevention of such activ-
ities and the bringing to justice of the perpetrators of violence towards edu-
cation. While GCPEA may, in principle, support that approach, there was 
and remains little it could do directly to effect a solution. That would fre-
quently require direct action by military forces or law enforcement agencies 
(preferably UN mandated) applying potentially lethal force against those 
posing a severe threat to education.  
Nevertheless, in many conflict circumstances, damage caused to schools 
and universities by military forces will have been the unintended and “inad-
vertent” collateral effect of otherwise “legitimate” attacks on military objec-
tives. This suggests that, while there is unlikely to be a perfect solution to the 
problem, there may be scope for optimism in at least some conflict circum-
stances. A degree of pragmatism seems appropriate, therefore. The Global 
Coalition concluded that there was some potential to encourage parties to 
conflicts—both States and ANSAs—which were not intent on deliberately 
targeting education to act in ways that would improve its protection.  
It is by no means naïve to assume that those engaged in armed conflict 
are, in many cases, seeking to achieve an objective that will be both politically 
beneficial for them and generally regarded as legitimate. Although breaches 
of IHL/LOAC occur far too frequently, many parties to armed conflicts will 
want to be seen as complying with normative limits on the application of 
force as, indeed, will individual fighters, many of whom will not wish to act 
dishonorably. This will be the case for both States and ANSAs, with the 
latter often having a particular interest in achieving a measure of legitimacy 
and a reputation for responsible action.27 With this in mind, GCPEA needed 
                                                                                                                      
27. The Swiss-based Geneva Call was formed to interact with ANSAs for the purpose 
of ensuring compliance with IHL/LOAC. It regularly conducts training for ANSA person-
nel, both in Geneva and in the field (something to which the author has contributed, in-
cluding training on the application of the Guidelines). Those groups that have engaged with 













to consider what it might realistically do to influence both States and ANSAs 
to modify their behavior in armed conflict and, by so doing, improve the 
protection of schools.   
Important research was carried out by Bede Sheppard for HRW, cover-
ing not only his country visits (including those to India and Thailand) but 
also a wide-ranging study into what policies States had already adopted on 
military use. While most had no specific policy, a sufficient number did, 
demonstrating that such policies were a realistic prospect.28 The analysis of 
the data gathered by UNESCO and GCPEA had already revealed that one 
important cause of attacks on education that might be reduced through a 
measure of international diplomacy and persuasion was military use of edu-
cational facilities. 
The close proximity of military forces to these facilities, or their actual 
presence within school and university buildings, including their deliberate 
use of them for military purposes, has the effect of transforming them into 
legitimate military objectives and depriving them of their protected civilian 
status. The result may not be limited to the damaging or destruction of the 
buildings but might also lead to the collateral killing or serious injury of ci-
vilians, including children present at the time of the attack.   
What had been revealed as the dire potential consequences attached to 
the presence of military forces in schools led to serious consideration being 
given within the civil society community to a campaign to achieve a total ban 
on military forces approaching schools or using them for any military pur-
pose at any time. While existing IHL/LOAC does not impose such a ban, 
perhaps it should. There were certainly voices within civil society organiza-
tions that favored such an approach and who regarded it as a realistic pro-
spect given, in particular, previous campaigns inspired by civil society such 
as those to ban anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions.29 Imposing 
                                                                                                                      
commitment to comply with legal standards—and are keen to be seen to do so, attending 
formal public signing ceremonies hosted by the City of Geneva.  
28. Sheppard’s work on this has been extremely important in pointing out what is pos-
sible and what constitutes good practice for States to consider. This has been a persuasive 
element of the advocacy process. This research has informed many of the publications pro-
duced in support of the SSD/Guidelines process. His latest published effort on this subject 
is BEDE SHEPPARD, PROTECTING SCHOOLS FROM MILITARY USE: LAW, POLICY AND MIL-
ITARY DOCTRINE (2019). 
29. These campaigns led to the 1997 Ottawa Convention and to the 2008 Oslo Con-
vention, the latter having entered into force in 2010. See Convention on the Prohibition of 













a legal ban would require new law, of course, and that would involve States 
negotiating a new conventional agreement.  
In late 2011 and early 2012, the author was engaged in discussions with 
Courtney Erwin of Education Above All and Bede Sheppard of HRW (co-
chairs of the GCPEA Military Use Task Force). One theme of those discus-
sions was the feasibility of negotiating and drafting new international law 
conventions, something they had already discussed with the staff of the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The author cautioned 
against the conventional law route and suggested the development of “soft 
law” as an alternative approach, a position that Erwin and Sheppard had, in 
fact, already come to favor. That came to be the eventual way forward. 
Guidelines would be drafted for the guidance of States and ANSAs, which, 
if applied, would have the potential to reduce the extent and intensity of 
military presence in and around schools and other educational establish-
ments. The Global Coalition adopted this approach and, in early 2012, 
launched the project to produce what eventually emerged as the Guidelines 
at the heart of the SSD.  
The first substantial step was to be an initial “brainstorming” meeting 
held over two days in May 2012, at the Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (Geneva Academy). Following a dis-
cussion of why education is important from a military-strategic perspective, 
what relevant law applies to it during armed conflict, and what constitutes 
“military use,” that meeting is discussed further below.     
 
III. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION 
 
There is a fundamental point to make about the military-strategic importance 
of education that explains its significance in a military doctrinal sense. The 
author was conscious from the beginning of his involvement with GCPEA 
that, given his military background and experience, as well as academic focus 
(a combination deliberately sought by Erwin and Sheppard), he had a poten-
tially vital role to play that ought to prove useful and influential during dis-
cussions with military professionals. He brought with him experience in de-
veloping military-strategic doctrine within the British Armed Forces, includ-
ing within their doctrinal “thinktank.” He had also experienced military 
                                                                                                                      
Destruction, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211; Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 













operations in areas of conflict.30 If the guidelines were to be successful, they 
would need to be regarded sympathetically by those who would implement 
them “on the ground” during actual armed conflicts. The Global Coalition 
was convinced that an experienced military professional’s involvement in the 
drafting process would be invaluable in producing a document that made 
sense to those who would have to use it. The military angle was vital, and, 
accordingly, no apology is offered for what may appear to be a digression.   
The years since the early 1990s have witnessed a noticeable increase in 
the number of conflicts, particularly those within States, with substantial ev-
idence of atrocities against civilian populations and infrastructure. In that 
time, international public opinion has clearly been affected by the humani-
tarian consequences of war. Civil society organizations have been motivated 
to focus an increasing amount of attention on the disastrous consequences 
of the international community’s clear inability to take effective action in 
response.  
The 1990s were dominated by the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia 
and the genocide in Rwanda. During the decade following, attention focused 
on the so-called “war on terror” following the September 11, 2001, attacks 
on New York and Washington, with major military interventions into Af-
ghanistan and Iraq. The decade just ended seemed to have been dominated 
by Syria and Yemen. While these notable conflicts may have had particularly 
high media profiles in relation to the decades they seemed to dominate, they 
have been merely the “tip of the iceberg,” with numerous other armed con-
flicts experienced, all having devastating consequences for the societies they 
have affected. In 2018 alone, according to the War Report produced by the 
Geneva Academy,31 there were sixty-nine armed conflicts on the territories 
of thirty States, many hardly reported in the mainstream press and broadcast 
media.32 It came as no surprise that this Geneva Academy report reflected 
the UNESCO and GCPEA reports discussed above.  
The effects of armed conflict on civilian infrastructure can be cata-
strophic and long term. This is certainly the case in relation to the function-
ing of schools, universities, and other educational establishments. Education 
is one of the vital ingredients for recovery from the effects of conflict. Failed 
                                                                                                                      
30. He had served for over four years in Northern Ireland between 1979 and 1982 but, 
more pertinently, had deployed, albeit briefly, into the Balkans and Sierra Leone, witnessing 
the military use of education facilities in both theaters.  
31. A joint center of the University of Geneva and the Graduate Institute of Interna-
tional and Development Studies. 












States and those affected by the devastating impact of prolonged periods of 
conflict desperately need educated and trained professionals during post-
conflict reconstruction. Without the people capable of responding to crises 
in all sectors, the challenges of recovery can be insurmountable. In any State 
or society affected by conflict, education is at risk, as the UNESCO and 
GCPEA reports bear out. Those reports contain a mass of evidence that is 
not necessary to repeat in this article.  
The Fourth UN Sustainable Development Goal makes it clear that edu-
cation is fundamental to all sectors necessary for a fully functioning, well-
governed society.33 It is the bedrock upon which all essential services and 
governance functions are constructed for the simple reason that they require 
well educated and appropriately trained people. A society emerging from a 
period of conflict when those services have been disrupted and following 
which sound governance has to be restored is wholly reliant on an educated 
population. If war rages for years, disrupting education in the process, post-
conflict reconstruction will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. All sec-
tors require educated people to function. 
This is not the place to provide a comprehensive account of the im-
portance of education. It is, however, worth reflecting briefly on the impact 
of armed conflict on one of the sectors that is fundamental for human secu-
rity and the stability of society. This is a sector that is unfortunately very 
much in the news as this article is being written. Provision of adequate health 
services is a vital ingredient of a fully functioning State, and this requires, 
above all, well-educated and trained medical professionals. A focus on one 
region will demonstrate the potential health consequences if education is se-
verely disrupted during conflict.  
During the 1990s and into the new century, States in West Africa, such 
as Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, were profoundly affected by con-
flict.34 The affected States were ravaged by civil wars (non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC)) characterized by significant cross-border incursions 
from neighboring States. The United Nations, the Economic Community of 
                                                                                                                      
33. See Sustainable Development Goals, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/sustaina-
bledevelopment/education/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2021). 
34. This is not the place to give a blow-by-blow account of the various armed conflicts 
in that region during those years, the various groups that fought in them, or the attempts by 
those who intervened seeking to bring the hostilities to an end; this would require a lengthy 













West African States, and the United Kingdom mounted interventions in at-
tempts to halt the violence.35  
It is estimated that over a quarter of a million people were killed and over 
a million displaced in Liberia alone. Many took refuge in neighboring States, 
but a significant proportion was internally displaced, with whole towns aban-
doned. Serious abuses of IHRL and grave breaches of IHL/LOAC were 
committed during the conflicts, including the widespread use of child sol-
diers by various warring factions.  
Importantly, in the context of this article, it was estimated that over 90 
percent of schools in Liberia were affected by the conflict. Over ten years 
after the end of these West African wars, in early 2014, the author visited the 
region with Veronique Aubert of Save the Children (UK) and co-chair of 
GCPEA. Our visit included discussions with government ministers, parlia-
mentarians, human rights activists, educationalists, and military officers in 
Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire. It also included visits to educational establish-
ments, including a school and the university in the Liberian capital, Monro-
via. Despite the years that had passed since the civil war ended in 2003, nei-
ther the school nor the university was fully functional. There was broken 
furniture in schoolrooms, libraries were virtually empty of books, and sci-
ence laboratories were devoid of the equipment necessary to support vital 
science education. The civil wars had ended, but the physical effects of those 
wars were still very much in evidence.  
By coincidence, as they were visiting the region, a number of States, in-
cluding Liberia, were beginning to suffer from outbreaks of Ebola. The 
World Health Organization described the Ebola epidemic in West Africa 
between 2014-16 as the “largest, most severe and most complex Ebola 
                                                                                                                      
35. The author, while still a serving officer in the UK’s Armed Forces, deployed into 
Sierra Leone as part of the UK’s Joint Task Force headquarters in the summer of 2001. Of 
particular relevance to his subsequent work with GCPEA, he witnessed conflict devastation 
first-hand, including in abandoned areas of the country that were still at that time under the 
control of the anti-government Revolutionary United Front (RUF). During a visit hosted 
by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to Koidu, in the diamond min-
ing area in the east of the country, he was taken to a previously abandoned school being 
used as a reception area for the disarming and reintegration of former RUF child soldiers. 
As a part of the process of reintegration into society, the children were put into classes and 
taught basic subjects by soldiers from UNAMSIL. This particular abandoned school was 
being put to what he regarded as very good use by military forces on a humanitarian mission. 














epidemic” in history.36 It recorded a total of 28,616 cases, with over a third 
of them (11,310) proving fatal before the international community managed 
to contain the disease through an effective public health intervention.37 The 
bulk of Ebola cases occurred in Liberia and its neighbors, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea.  
Without properly functioning health infrastructure and effective early-
warning systems in the region, the disease spread rapidly, and local health 
professionals were overwhelmed by the scale of the task facing them, reveal-
ing the failures of disjointed and under-resourced healthcare systems. An 
important contributory factor was a dire shortage of trained medical profes-
sionals. One of the reasons for this was Liberia’s inability through both the 
years of conflict and subsequently, to provide adequate facilities for the ed-
ucation, training, and development of sufficient medical personnel to deal 
with even the routine demands of a society located in a challenging environ-
ment. The problem was rendered even more acute by the emigration of ed-
ucated professionals, both during the civil war and after. Ebola was an emer-
gency that was not detected early enough due to the lack of sufficient medical 
providers throughout the country. Dealing with the problem once it had ma-
terialized overwhelmed Liberia’s medical staff. Containing the epidemic re-
quired substantial international intervention.  
Liberia simply had no prospect of coping on its own—but it was not the 
worst affected State in the region. That was Sierra Leone, ravaged by years 
of civil war that ended in 2002 and, over a decade later, still a broken country 
with extremely weak infrastructure struggling to achieve some measure of 
post-conflict reconstruction. The World Health Organization reported 
14,124 Ebola cases in Sierra Leone, 3,955 of which proved fatal.38 Liberia 
and Sierra Leone not only had Ebola in common; their wars had been linked 
in the complex series of violent struggles fought across national boundaries 
that had destroyed the social and administrative infrastructure of the region. 
Significantly, the lack of sufficient trained medical personnel in that re-
gion of West Africa meant that the health campaign against Ebola required 
substantial foreign intervention, with medical teams deployed from around 
the world. Other States supported that intervention for a combination of 
altruism and humanitarian necessity on the one hand and self-interest in pre-
venting the spread of a dangerous disease to their own regions on the other. 
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https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ebola-virus-disease.  













As a result, Ebola was successfully contained and did not develop into a 
global pandemic.  
By unfortunate coincidence, this article is being written at the height of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, which is close to exhausting all States’ medical 
resources, even those of the most developed States. It goes without saying 
that those States currently experiencing armed conflict, such as Syria and 
Yemen, or which have yet to recover fully from past conflicts, are extremely 
vulnerable to a global pandemic—which is also, of course, severely limiting 
the potential for foreign medical intervention.  
Liberia and Sierra Leone’s recent past experiences provide compelling 
evidence that a well-developed functioning system of education capable of 
serving a country’s needs is an essential element of a sound, stable, and well-
run society. The existence, or the re-establishing, of a sound educational sys-
tem must be an essential ingredient of post-conflict reconstruction. Educa-
tion will represent an essential consideration when States are contemplating 
financial aid to conflict-affected societies, sound education being a precon-
dition for the successful implementation over time of viable aid programs. 
For this reason, education must be regarded as a significant military concern 
at both the strategic and tactical levels.  
The legitimate use of military force is based on various criteria, including 
the need for what Just War theorists refer to as “right intent.”39 Responsible 
military forces intervening for humanitarian purposes clearly need to con-
sider the ultimate aims of their presence in regions of conflict. They must 
include the reestablishment of sound governance within the societies and 
territories badly affected by conflict, and this is only possible in a well-edu-
cated society. Legitimate military campaigns today consist of various phases, 
from planning and preparation through deployment and intervention into 
the region affected, followed by a probable combat phase and, vitally, the 
reestablishment of a functioning society after the conflict is concluded. 
Armed force is an instrument of policy, and a successful and legitimate mil-
itary campaign has to lead to some measure of post-conflict settlement and 
                                                                                                                      
39. “Right intent” is one of several criteria, the establishment of which contributes to 
the categorization of a war as “just” in the Just War tradition. It is not to be confused with 
“just cause,” another separate criterion. See the explanations in, for example, ALEX J. BEL-
LAMY, JUST WARS: FROM CICERO TO IRAQ 122–23, 211–12 (2006); CHARLES GUTHRIE & 
MICHAEL QUINLAN, JUST WAR: THE JUST WAR TRADITION: ETHICS IN MODERN WAR-
FARE 24–26 (2007); 2 Steven Haines, Genocide, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 













recovery. The strategic objective will not be achieved by mere military victory 
over those forces engaged in the conflict. Post-conflict reconstruction will 
be a vital element of a sound military-strategic objective.40  
Contemporary military doctrine should, therefore, require military action 
during all phases of a campaign to be consistent with the military-strategic 
objective. The need for tactical action to be consistent with the strategic ob-
jective is a foundational rationale for the systems of rules of engagement 
(ROE) widely utilized by many armed forces today.41 If the strategic objec-
tive is to establish or maintain a sound and well-ordered society post-con-
flict—as it should be—then it is vitally important that nothing done for tac-
tical convenience should risk undermining the strategic purpose of a military 
campaign. Tactical military action that adversely affects civil education will 
invariably fail to meet that test, even if it is not manifestly unlawful. Given 
that one important reason for the vulnerability of education to attack is the 
close proximity of military forces to schools and universities—or indeed, 
their use for military purpose—military commanders at all levels should ex-
ercise great caution when deploying military personnel anywhere near edu-
cational establishments and be even more circumspect if they are considering 
using them for military purposes.  
It is vitally important to regard such caution as entirely consistent with 
the strategic aim of a sound and responsible military campaign. The desirable 
campaign end-state should be a properly functioning society. Educational 
provision is an important part of that and damaging schools during the com-
bat phase would clearly work against it. The author has stressed this point 
whenever he has discussed the Guidelines with naturally skeptical military 
audiences. They are skeptical because they are wary of any new constraints 
on tactical action, especially constraints that seem to be stricter than the law 
demands. Once it is pointed out, however, that damage to schools can un-
dermine their ultimate strategic purpose but that their use of them is 
                                                                                                                      
40. For more detail on the author’s argument, see Steven Haines, The United Kingdom 
and Legitimate Military Objectives: Current Practice . . . and Future Trends?, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES: SYMPOSIUM IN HONOUR OF KNUT IPSEN 127, 135–41 
(Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007). 
41. For information on rules of engagement, see DENNIS MANDSAGER, ALAN COLE, 
PHILLIP DREW & ROB MCLOUGHLIN, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HANDBOOK (2009) [here-
inafter RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HANDBOOK]. For another further “open” source of advice 
on ROE, see CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) HANDBOOK 













permitted in exceptional circumstances (that pragmatically that option re-
mains available to them), they regard the Guidelines very much more favor-
ably. This was the author’s experience when discussing the Guidelines with 
military personnel in a wide range of circumstances—at NATO Headquar-
ters, in ministries of defense, in military headquarters in West Africa, and, 
importantly, with members of armed non-State groups. Once these factors 
were explained, military professionals frequently became enthusiastic advo-
cates of the thinking behind the Guidelines.  
 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EDUCATION IN ARMED CONFLICT 
 
From an international legal perspective, the provision and protection of ed-
ucation is invariably underpinned by IHRL, which applies at all times, in 
both peace and war. In contrast, IHL/LOAC applies only in the context of 
armed conflict; it is widely (though not universally) regarded as the lex specialis 
once armed conflict has broken out. The relationship between these two 
bodies of law has been the subject of substantial academic legal analysis and 
debate, especially since the 1990s.42 This article is not concerned with that 
debate, however. We merely acknowledge it and move on. It is appropriate, 
though, to consider briefly what each of these distinct bodies of law (IHRL 
and IHL/LOAC) says about education, the rights to it, and its protection 
during armed conflict.43  
 
A. International Human Rights Law 
  
Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares, in its 
opening sentence, that: “Everyone has the right to education.”44 The Decla-
ration itself is not legally binding, but it has been the foundation upon which 
                                                                                                                      
42. For a collection of essays on the relationship, see INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Roberta Arnold & Noelle Quénivet eds., 2008). 
43. Shortly after the formation of GCPEA, Education Above All (part of the Global 
Coalition) commissioned a legal handbook, prepared by the British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law between 2010 and 2012 that was published in 2012. This has since 
been updated and recently re-published. See KRISTEN HAUSLER, NICOLE URBAN, ROBERT 
MCCORQUODALE & SIOBHAN SMITH, PROTECTING EDUCATION IN INSECURITY AND 
ARMED CONFLICT: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2020).  
44. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 28(1) (Dec. 10, 













numerous IHRL instruments have been built in the decades since 1948. 
These instruments include the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)45 and the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child,46 as well as various regional IHRL treaties, including the African 
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter),47 the Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (San Salvador Pro-
tocol),48 and the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human 
Rights.49 The right to education is well established in these instruments of 
conventional law and is now generally established in custom.  
Education is empowering of those individuals who are able to benefit 
from it. It can also be regarded as a “multiplier” in that it enables a host of 
other human rights to achieve meaningful substance. To quote from two 
leading academics, “the right to education, as well as having intrinsic value, 
has great instrumental significance in relation to the enjoyment of other hu-
man rights.”50 The denial of the right to education not only seriously under-
mines the potential of individuals but also has a profound collective or soci-
etal consequence. As has been argued above, societies deprived of education 
will have limited potential for recovery from conflict.  
While there is a clear right to education, it does not apply fully across all 
levels. Under ICESCR Article 13, only the provision of primary education is 
compulsory. Secondary and higher levels of education are differentiated, 
                                                                                                                      
45. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
46. See UNCRC, supra note 2. It opened for signature on November 20, 1989, and 
entered into force on September 2, 1990. All UN member States are party, with the excep-
tion of the United States. 
47. African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 26, 1981, 21 INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL MATERIALS 59 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), https://au.int/sites/de-
fault/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peo-
ples_rights_e.pdf.   
48. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1621 (1989) (entered into force November 16, 1999), 
https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-52.html.   
49. First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 
U.N.T.S. 262 (entered into force on May 18, 1954), https://www.coe.int/en/web/echr-
toolkit/protocole-1.  
50. SUSAN MARKS & ANDREW CLAPHAM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LEXICON 
136 (2005) (commenting on the “multiplier” effect articulated in KATERINA TOMAŠEVSKI, 













both from primary education and between each level. Secondary education 
“shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate 
means,” while higher education “shall be made equally accessible to all, on 
the basis of capacity.”51 In an ideal situation, all children of primary and sec-
ondary school age52 would be benefiting from free education, while adults 
(and some older children) would have the opportunity to pursue higher (uni-
versity) education if they met the necessary criteria for access, based on ca-
pacity and potential ability (typically assessed/measured by qualifications ob-
tained during secondary schooling). While this is not the place for a discus-
sion of the finer points of educational policy, it is pertinent to state that ide-
ally all children should attend school. At the same time, suitably qualified 
adults should have access to universities and colleges for further education.  
States bear a responsibility to respect human rights, to protect them, to 
fulfil them, and to promote them. They are under an IHRL obligation to 
ensure education is available for those who have a right to it. There is an 
obvious obligation to provide and protect education, but there is also an 
obligation not to deprive individuals of educational opportunities. Thus, 
IHRL obligations in relation to education rest on all parties during an armed 
conflict; there is an obligation to provide and protect it, on the one hand, 
and an obligation not to disrupt it on the other. Such is the education-related 
IHRL backdrop to the application of IHL/LOAC. 
 
B. International Humanitarian Law/Law of Armed Conflict 
 
The relevant part of IHL/LOAC concerning the protection of education in 
armed conflict is that dealing with the conduct of hostilities, more specifi-
cally, the law of targeting. The recognized and relevant sources of 
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IHL/LOAC include conventional law from 1907,53 1949,54 and 1977,55 and 
customary law, most recently assessed by the ICRC in 2005.56 While the iden-
tification of what is and what is not a lawful target can appear to be a simple 
process (e.g., soldiers as distinct from civilians and military vehicles as dis-
tinct from public transport), the law is not entirely straightforward, especially 
when its complexity is compounded by the need to take into account the 
international or non-international character of the armed conflict in which it 
is to be applied. A full description of it is certainly not possible in the few 
paragraphs available here.57 Fortunately, that is not necessary, and the dis-
cussion can be relatively brief.  
The potential complexity of the law was an issue of slight concern when 
the Guidelines were being drafted. In the initial stages of the project,58 it had 
been determined that they should be short and easily understood. It was also 
seen as important that they should be generic for application in both inter-
national armed conflicts (IACs) and NIACs, and regardless of the identity of 
the parties to the conflict (States and/or ANSAs). This prompted a number 
of questions. Should the Guidelines reflect the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
(including Common Article 3 in relation to NIAC 59) or the two 1977 Addi-
tional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions? The majority of armed 
                                                                                                                      
53. Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539. 
54. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
the Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention 
(II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Mem-
bers of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention 
(III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GCIV]. 
55. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
56. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (the ICRC’s useful, though not infallible, source of opin-
ion on the customary law); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
57. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, see WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE 
LAW OF TARGETING (2012) (which covers the topic in just over six hundred pages). 
58. See infra Part VI.  













conflicts of concern were of a non-international character, but not all were. 
The Additional Protocols were not universally binding, but the four Geneva 
Conventions were. Did this fact necessitate the privileging of the conven-
tional law from 1949 over more recent law dating from 1977? What might 
be the influence of customary law?  
As the drafting commenced, the author judged it sensible to use the most 
recent conventional law as the guide. In the case of IAC, the legal rules to be 
privileged were those in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. In the case of NIAC, the law of reference was to be that in the 
1977 Additional Protocol II rather than that derived from an interpretation 
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Notwithstanding the 
prevalence of NIAC, the rules in Additional Protocol I were used as the 
convenient first point of reference. The wording of each successive draft of 
the Guidelines was, however, checked by the author for consistency with the 
other established sources of the law. Such consistency was maintained 
throughout the research and development process, from the initial drafting 
in October 2012 in preparation for the Lucens Roundtable60 to the final 
promulgation of the Lucens Guidelines in July 2013. In doing so, the rules 
directly relevant to the protection of schools and universities from attack—
those giving substance to the principle of distinction and those to do with 
taking the necessary precautions in attack—did not prove difficult to reflect 
in the wording of the Guidelines. Ultimately, that wording managed to cover 
all possibilities considered during the research and development process.  
The first rules to be considered were those derived from the principle of 
distinction. Civilian schools and other educational facilities, those attending 
them, and those conducting the teaching and providing support, are all pro-
tected in law from attack through their civilian/non-combatant status.61 
There is clearly a need to distinguish between those individuals defined as 
civilians and others categorized as combatants, the latter being members of 
the armed forces of a party to a conflict who have the right to participate 
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directly in hostilities.62 All civilians are protected persons unless they directly 
participate in hostilities, in which case they lose protection and can be subject 
to lawful attack.63  
Civilian objects are defined as all objects not classified as “military ob-
jectives,” the latter being defined as “[t]hose objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the cir-
cumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”64 
As will be obvious from this definition, a civilian school would ordinarily 
not be a military objective and would, therefore, be a civilian object protected 
from attack. If, however, it started to be used by the military forces of one 
of the parties to a conflict, it would cease to be a protected civilian object 
and would become a military objective potentially subject to lawful attack. 
The next Part of the article will discuss what is meant by military use, but it 
is by no means necessarily the case that the presence or close proximity of 
military personnel or equipment will transform a civilian school into a mili-
tary objective. A school may remain a civilian object even if a soldier or a 
military vehicle is present within it. The presence may be merely the result 
of a brief visit by military personnel, for example, to check on the status of 
the building and arrangements for its security. In these circumstances, the 
visiting soldier or military vehicle will remain a military objective subject to 
attack, but the school itself most certainly will not. The result may be the 
targeting of the soldier or the military vehicle within the school but not of 
the school itself. In these or similar circumstances (in which there may be a 
significant amount of ambiguity as to the reason for the military presence), 
the school may be vulnerable to damage as the collateral effect of the lawful 
targeting of the military objective located within it.  
It is in these circumstances, in particular, in which precautions in and 
against attack are of crucial importance. The military forces of all parties have 
an obligation to take precautions to avoid injury to civilians and damage to 
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civilian objects. This means taking precautions to protect civilians and civil-
ian objects from the effects of an attack.65 It also means taking precautions 
when launching an attack.66  
The former obligation has to do with avoiding, to the maximum feasible 
extent, locating military forces in close proximity to civilian populations and 
taking other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, indi-
vidual civilians, and civilian objects under their control against the dangers 
resulting from military operations. In relation to schools and other educa-
tional establishments, this obligation amounts to not using them for a mili-
tary purpose, to not basing military forces in or around them, and not using 
them in any other way for military benefit. Significantly, it is not an absolute 
ban on the military use of schools or placing military forces within or in close 
proximity to them; if it is not feasible to avoid doing so, then it is not unlaw-
ful to do so. What is and what is not feasible is a matter of judgment in the 
circumstances; there is no objective test to be applied.  
If a school or a university appears to be being used for a military purpose, 
apparently depriving it of its civilian protection and rendering it a military 
objective, the opposing military force may legitimately target it. Any attack 
must be subject to precautions in attack, however. Targeting law stipulates 
that, “In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to 
civilian purposes, such as . . . a school, is being used to make an effective 
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.”67 
Precautions require doing everything feasible to verify the loss of its protected 
status and to confirm it as a military objective. Once that requirement is sat-
isfied, a judgment has to be reached about whether an attack on it would 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian ob-
jects, or a combination thereof that would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated in launching the attack. 
What is “excessive” and how that is measured against “military advantage” 
is a matter of judgment; there is no objective test. It is possible that a military 
commander could decide to mount an attack on a school using these criteria, 
determining that the military advantage to be gained exceeds the cost in ci-
vilian lives likely to be lost, including those of children present in the school 
at the time of the attack.  
Finally, in this necessarily cursory treatment of the law relating to the 
protection of schools and universities during armed conflict, it is worth 
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mentioning the obligations placed on occupying powers during IACs, and 
on national authorities during NIACs. Occupying powers are under an obli-
gation to cooperate with national and local authorities to “facilitate the 
proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of chil-
dren.”68 During NIACs, authorities are under an obligation to provide chil-
dren with “an education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents.”69 The 
protection of education is a legal obligation in all circumstances during 
armed conflict. 
 
V. THE MILITARY USE OF SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION 
 
The military use of schools and military engagement with education is not 
uncommon. Indeed, in some States a measure of military presence in schools 
and universities is routine at all times. In the UK, for example, there are 
military cadet units in many schools and universities, providing popular ex-
tracurricular activities for pupils and students.70 In a stable society in peace-
time, a low-level military presence of this sort need not be either problematic 
or controversial (although some civil society groups believe any military in-
teraction with civil education is inappropriate). If a State is engaged in an 
armed conflict, however, especially a NIAC on its own territory, the presence 
of military personnel in educational establishments or their close proximity 
to them should most certainly become a matter of general concern, for the 
legal reasons outlined above.  
The military use of schools is the focus in the Safe Schools context be-
cause it is the principal reason why educational establishments are rendered 
vulnerable to legitimate attack during armed conflict. The GCPEA explana-
tion of military use has been based on the significant research into military 
engagements with schools carried out by Sheppard for HRW, by UNICEF, 
and subsequently by the Global Coalition itself. Its understanding of “uses 
in support of the military effort” include:  
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[T]he broad range of activities in which the fighting forces of parties to 
armed conflict may engage with the physical space of a school or university 
in support of the military effort, whether temporarily or on a long-term 
basis. The term includes, but is not limited to, the following uses: as bar-
racks or bases; for offensive or defensive positioning; for storage of weap-
ons or ammunition; for interrogation or detention; for military training or 
drilling of soldiers; for military recruitment of children contrary to interna-
tional law; as observation posts; as a position from which to fire weapons 
(firing position) or to guide weapons onto their targets (fire control).71 
 
Schools can be ideal physical locations for military use as bases or head-
quarters and will be particularly attractive if they have been abandoned. A 
military commander, operating in an area from which the civilian population 
has been evacuated, could well look upon an abandoned school as the per-
fect solution to his need for a base. Typically, they are located in tactically 
significant built-up areas. The better examples often have areas of land 
around them conveniently available for parking military vehicles. They may 
even have perimeter fences enclosing them for reasons of security. They will 
almost certainly have good sized rooms and plenty of them, often with larger 
halls for sizeable gatherings and spaces suitable for use as barrack accommo-
dation. The better situated will have connected utilities and may even have 
showers associated with sporting facilities that can be used by accommo-
dated military personnel. When the author visited the school in Monrovia 
still affected by military use ten years after conflict ended in Liberia, he de-
liberately sized it up as a potential military base; it was close to being physi-
cally perfect. It is not surprising that abandoned schools have been used by 
military forces in the past; they are likely to be considered seriously for mili-
tary purposes into the future.  
With abandoned schools, military use, while problematic, does not place 
children, their teachers, or support staff at immediate risk of injury or death 
from enemy targeting. Functioning schools are obviously a different matter. 
Any military presence will invite attack from opposing military forces, even 
if children and staff are present. It is unlikely, of course, that those involved 
in education will be physically present in schools or universities at all times, 
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day and night. Educational establishments will ordinarily not be occupied 
overnight, over weekends, or during holidays (notwithstanding some educa-
tional institutions having a residential dimension, with boarding schools and 
university halls of residence being prominent examples). During longer pe-
riods of vacation, they may be closed for extended periods. While it may 
appear unnecessary to state this, it is important to appreciate that an empty 
school is not necessarily abandoned. While it may be thought generally ac-
ceptable for a military force to take advantage of an abandoned school for a 
limited period, it will be very much less so if the school is still in regular use 
but briefly and routinely closed in the normal course of its operation. Any 
use of the school during such times would render its status profoundly am-
biguous; is it a protected civilian object or a legitimate military objective—
and at what point precisely does it transition from one status to the other? 
The dual use of buildings in this way risks completely undermining the prin-
ciple of distinction at the very heart of IHL/LOAC. 
The use of schools—and other educational institutions—in support of 
the military effort is not, however, the only reason why military forces may 
be present in and around them. As GCPEA has acknowledged, the term 
military use does not include instances in which forces are present in the 
vicinity of schools and universities to provide for the school’s protection—
or as a security measure when schools are being used as election polling sta-
tions (a common occurrence) or for other non-military purposes. Military 
commanders are faced with a genuine dilemma if they are operating in a 
conflict zone, in a location that is on the “front line” and subject to attack 
from opposing forces. If they become aware of a still-functioning school 
vulnerable to attack, their instinctive response may well be to provide secu-
rity to the school and to protect the children being educated as well as the 
teaching and support staff. Placing guards around the school (even inside it) 
may seem to be the obvious action to take. Yet, it may actually have the 
opposite effect to that intended. Military forces providing security to the 
school will remain military objectives, as far as opposing forces are con-
cerned, and their presence may render the school and those in it vulnerable 
to the collateral effects of an attack. This situation is almost certainly the 
most difficult requiring a decision to be made about military engagement 
with education facilities. While the military defense of a school may under-
mine its protected civilian status in most situations, it may become an imper-
ative in others when, for example, the opposing forces are ideologically com-
mitted to disrupting education, especially that of girls. Every set of circum-












VI. DEVELOPING THE GUIDELINES 
 
Having discussed background factual, military-strategic, and legal factors, we 
can now proceed with an account of the development of the Guidelines. 
Apart from the exploratory discussions within GCPEA, which had lasted 
from 2010 to the beginning of 2012, the process leading to the publication 
of what became known as the Lucens Guidelines in July 2013 was initiated 
in May 2012 by the convening of a workshop in Geneva. The exploratory 
discussions had eventually favored the promulgation of guidelines on mili-
tary use, rather than the development of new conventional law. As the ICRC 
representatives during the process pointed out, the core of the problem con-
cerning the protection of schools was not a shortage of law but a failure on 
the part of parties to armed conflict to comply adequately with both the letter 
and spirit of the law that already existed. Nevertheless, there were other con-
siderations as well. These included the difficulties likely to be experienced in 
getting States engaged in treaty negotiations, the length of time these were 
likely to take (even if they proved feasible), and the likelihood that the text 
eventually arrived at would contain too many compromises and ambiguities 
in the quest for broad international agreement. Any convention/treaty was 
also unlikely to be “user friendly” for those military personnel making deci-
sions “on the ground” in challenging situations. They would need sound but 
concise guidance, with guidelines tailor-made for ease of reference. Produc-
ing them would not need to involve States in complex and protracted nego-
tiations and they could be created by a process involving a select and spe-
cialist group of experts. While relying on existing law, they could lead over 
time to a change in behavior more protective of education than current law 
demanded—and that might even lead to a shift in the law itself through de-
veloping custom.   
By 2012 there was sound evidence that “guidelines” had value as a means 
of obtaining compliance with international law and as a means of improving 
regulatory regimes in general. Often referred to as “soft law,” guidelines 
seemed capable of being deployed effectively to “plug gaps” in the law, to 
clarify it when the conventional law was vague or ambiguous, and to act as 
an aid to compliance with the law. Pertinent examples included instruments 
like the Montreaux Document on private military security companies72 and the 
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associated Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, 73 the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights74 and Internal Displacement,75 and the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities.76  
Although favoring the guidelines approach, GCPEA considered it sen-
sible to obtain the views of a select group of experts drawn from civil society 
organizations, the ICRC, UN agencies, and a small number of States. This 
was just one of several reasons why Diya Nijhowne, the chief executive of 
GCPEA, Courtney Erwin of Education Above All, and Bede Sheppard of 
HRW organized an expert workshop at the Geneva Academy in May 2012. 
It was hosted and partly facilitated by the Academy’s joint directors, Andrew 
Clapham and Paola Gaeta, and their colleague Stuart Casey-Maslen, all of 
whom are leading specialists in both IHRL and IHL/LOAC. The other at-
tendees included representatives of the armed forces of the Philippines and 
Qatar, the ministries of foreign affairs of the Netherlands, Philippines, and 
Switzerland, UNICEF, UNESCO, the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNDPKO), the ICRC, and the NGOs Protect Education in 
Insecurity and Conflict, Education Above All, HRW, and Geneva Call.   
At the beginning of the workshop, GCPEA revealed the results of re-
search it had commissioned on the military use of education facilities, which 
confirmed the importance of the subject. Over the course of the two days, a 
number of conclusions and principles were arrived at and generally acknowl-
edged by the majority of those present. There was, deliberately, no attempt 
to arrive at a formal agreement, and no individual attendee was obliged to 
declare their support. This was particularly important for those State officials 
who had agreed to participate; they were attending in their personal capacity 
and certainly not committing their State to any position through either their 
attendance or contribution. What might be described as a general consensus 
emerged. The meeting's sense was that the conclusions and principles 
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discerned should serve as the backdrop to the drafting of a set of voluntary 
guidelines that States and ANSAs would be encouraged to adopt and apply.  
The author contributed to these discussions and noted the principal 
themes that emerged. The Global Coalition also produced a paper summa-
rizing the workshop discussions and conclusions.77 Apart from general sup-
port for the important decision to produce guidelines rather than new con-
ventional law, the conclusions and principles can be summarized as follows:  
• The guidelines were to reflect international law as it stood; they 
would not propose changes to it or set out to develop the law. While con-
sistent with existing international law—both IHL/LOAC and IHRL—they 
were not to be legally binding in themselves. They would most certainly not 
affect existing obligations under international law.  
• The guidelines were to be drafted to encourage a shift in military 
behavior leading to better protections for schools and universities in times 
of armed conflict. In particular, they were to encourage a reduction in the 
use of schools by the fighting forces of parties to armed conflict in support 
of their military effort.  
• The intention was to produce a document containing the guidelines 
that States and ANSAs would be invited to adopt and which they would be 
able to promulgate in a manner to suit their specific circumstances.  
• The guidelines were to be based on what was practically achievable. 
They were to acknowledge that parties to armed conflict are invariably faced 
with difficult dilemmas requiring pragmatic solutions. They were not to be 
markedly prescriptive.  
• The guidelines were to reflect evidence of good practice already ap-
plied by some parties to armed conflict for the protection of schools and 
universities during military operations. These included statements of in-
tended practice in such documents as training handbooks, promulgated doc-
trine, and legal manuals.  
• The guidelines were to be produced for the use of all parties to armed 
conflict, both States and ANSAs, and for wide dissemination and implemen-
tation.  
• The guidelines were to be generic, if possible, to be applied in both 
IACs and NIACs. 
                                                                                                                      













• While the guidelines were to be produced specifically for application 
during armed conflict, they were also to be crafted in a way that would render 
them useful and instructive for post-conflict and other comparable situa-
tions—including those tense but non-conflict situations with the potential 
to cross the threshold into armed conflict.78 
• They were to be brief and expressed in simple and easily understood 
language; they were to be accessible, avoiding legal and other specialist jar-
gon. 
There were significant ideas that were rejected. These included a sugges-
tion that the application of the proposed guidelines be extended to include 
non-armed conflict situations. Another was to encourage the complete 
avoidance of any military interaction with education. The author raised ex-
amples of positive interactions, including during conflicts, to persuade at-
tendees that a complete ban was not only unnecessary but undesirable in 
some exceptional situations. (I was able to quote the example from my own 
experience with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone of the use of an 
abandoned school as a reception point for child soldiers79). The author also 
believed it would be unrealistic, in the sense that it would almost certainly 
have resulted in very few States agreeing to adopt the guidelines. A complete 
ban would also have gone well beyond the legal requirement. 
The final agreement to emerge was that which approved the author as a 
suitable legal and military “expert” to draft the proposed guidelines. His ini-
tial remit was to prepare a discussion document (essentially a first draft of 
the proposed guidelines) to be reviewed and “brainstormed” during a further 
expert workshop to be convened in November 2012 at Château de Lucens 
in the Canton of Vaud (referred to since as the Lucens Roundtable).  
As the author was preparing the discussion document, an event occurred 
in Pakistan which would have a major influence on the campaign to protect 
schools. On October 9, 2012, a fifteen-year-old schoolgirl, Malala Yousafzai, 
was traveling on a bus heading home from school. She was in conversation 
with her friends about schoolwork. Two members of the Taliban stopped 
the bus intending to kill Malala and her friends to put an end to Malala’s 
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outspoken public advocacy for education for girls. They boarded the bus, 
found her, and shot her, but their murder attempt failed. Malala survived and 
was eventually flown to the United Kingdom for emergency medical treat-
ment. She subsequently made a remarkable recovery. She became a global 
figure overnight and was the recipient of the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize for her 
continuing advocacy for safe education for girls. The GCPEA campaign to 
protect education was timely indeed. 
The author delivered the discussion document to GCPEA in late-Octo-
ber 2012, and it was circulated to participants in advance of the roundtable 
the following week. The group of experts gathered in Château de Lucens 
was larger than that which met the previous May in Geneva, although it did 
not include all of the May attendees. In putting together this group, 
GCPEA’s aim was to have a collection of specialists from a range of relevant 
backgrounds that would bring different perspectives to the workshop. The 
gathering proved to be challenging and stimulating, and it more than satisfied 
the need to adequately critique the discussion document. Those present in-
cluded armed forces representatives from Finland and Qatar; State officials 
from the Canadian Department of National Defence, the ministries of edu-
cation in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Nepal, the ministries of foreign affairs 
of Argentina, Norway, Germany, and Switzerland, and the Office of the 
President of the Philippines; UN officials from the Office of the UN Secre-
tary General’s Special Representative on Children in Armed Conflict, 
UNICEF, and UNDPKO; staff of the ICRC; and civil society representa-
tives from Amnesty International, Education Above All, Geneva Call, HRW, 
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Education Cluster and, of course, 
GCPEA itself. Arguably, the author added to the mix of perspectives 
through his former official role within the UK Armed Forces and Ministry 
of Defence. An expected participant from the Dutch government was forced 
to cancel due to other commitments. There were also apologies from the 
South Sudan Ministry of Education, Geneva Academy, and Save the Chil-
dren International. 
As with the Geneva meeting, individuals attended in their private capac-
ity but, very obviously, were involved because of their State, institutional, or 
organizational association and the consequential expertise and perspectives 
they brought to Lucens. They were not committing their parent institutions 
or organizations to any position relative to the outcome of the process and 
the discussions were conducted under strict Chatham House rules (no views 












Nobody drafting a discussion document in these circumstances and sub-
mitting it for debate can afford to be sensitive to criticism. The author’s dis-
cussion document was debated with rigor, with almost every sentence, as 
well as its structure and overall content, subjected to intense criticism.80 The 
robust challenge to which the document was subjected was a wholly neces-
sary part of the process of producing guidelines that would reflect the need 
to both protect schools (and universities) from military use and provide a 
practical framework that States (and ANSAs) would be prepared to adopt. 
The end result needed to be robust and capable of standing up to challenge, 
especially from those expected to apply them and respect their value from a 
military perspective. The methodology adopted by the author was intended 
with precisely this objective very much in mind.  
Over the two days of intensive discussion, many points were raised that 
fed into the post-Lucens process. The author was also most grateful for val-
uable comments forwarded in their absence by the Dutch colleague who had 
been unable to travel to Switzerland.81 The development of the subsequent 
text between the Lucens meeting in November 2012 and the publication of 
the Lucens Guidelines in July 2013 was the outcome of a research process 
involving an expert reference group of selected individuals commenting on 
subsequent iterations of a set of draft guidelines. The author had initial post-
Lucens discussions with Diya Nijhowne, Bede Sheppard, and Courtney Er-
win and produced a fresh draft for GCPEA consideration; this was circu-
lated to them and other GCPEA colleagues on January 28, 2013. It was then 
forwarded for comment to the expert reference group, which included gov-
ernment, NGO, ICRC, and academic representatives. After their comments 
were received, a further iteration was circulated for comment on March 28. 
This process was repeated with yet another iteration circulated on April 19 
and a final version in May.  
The process of drafting, circulating, and receiving comments and then 
taking account of those comments to produce further drafts was by no 
means a smooth one. While consensus was arrived at immediately on the 
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structure and the general content of six guidelines, there was a significant 
degree of disagreement on the detail, with often two quite opposing views 
about detailed elements of the draft. Sentences and even single words were 
subjected to critique. The author examined every comment and attempted 
to reflect them all in the draft as it developed. Inevitably, however, he had to 
choose between opposing opinions, using his judgment to arrive at a form 
of words that he hoped would obtain agreement at each stage.  
In all, four iterations were produced. The development was moving to-
wards an agreed text, but there remained disagreement about some of the 
detail. To complete the process, therefore, in May 2013, the author circulated 
what he referred to as a “Red Card Draft.”82 What he requested from those 
making comments was that they restrict themselves to raising a “red card” 
only to those elements of the draft they could not endorse. If they could live 
with an aspect of the text, they should refrain from registering their opposi-
tion even if they would have preferred different wording. This proved to be 
a very successful way of bringing the drafting process to a close. It resulted 
in no dissenting views being expressed, and a consensus was finally reached 
over the wording of the draft guidelines. These were published by GCPEA 
on July 8, 2013, as the Draft Lucens Guidelines for Protecting Schools and 
Universities from Military Use during Armed Conflict.83  
The document published under that title consisted of more than the 
Guidelines themselves. It opened with a preface introducing the Guidelines, 
followed by a section providing definitions of “Schools and Universities,” 
the “Fighting Forces of parties to armed conflict,” and what constituted 
“Use in support of the military effort.” Then came the six Guidelines, which 
occupied just two of the document’s eighteen pages. Finally, there were two 
substantial annexes, one detailing the “Applicable International Legal 
Framework” and the other providing “Examples of Good Domestic Law, 
Guidance and Practice.”84 There was much of value in the document as a 
whole, but the most significant part was the two-page presentation of the 
Guidelines themselves; they were the central feature.  
Despite their publication by GCPEA, the Guidelines remained merely a 
draft. Their designation as such was deliberate. The purpose of the published 
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document was to take the draft up to the next higher and very necessary 
level. The Global Coalition well recognized that if its efforts to protect edu-
cation from attack were to achieve a real difference on the ground in areas 
of armed conflict, the Guidelines would need widespread acknowledgement 
and acceptance at the State level. To achieve that would require States to take 
a genuine interest and for some to assist by advocating for their acceptance. 
This demanded exposure at the international level and a diplomatic effort 
beyond the capability of civil society organizations. While GCPEA had ini-
tiated and taken the process thus far, with some useful engagement and as-
sistance from States, for the Guidelines to succeed would require States to 
take the lead, with GCPEA in a supporting role. An overly defensive attitude 
to the Guidelines’ text by GCPEA would have been inappropriate in the 
context of a bid to obtain State support; the door was deliberately left open 
for further development of the text. 
The process of developing the Guidelines having commenced in Geneva 
in the spring of 2012, it made absolute sense to focus future advocacy and 
development effort on the international community within that city; indeed, 
there was no better place to do this. The term “International Geneva” in 
many ways defines the city. The size of the UN footprint in Geneva is larger 
than that in New York, with a number of key UN agencies headquartered 
there. There are numerous State missions permanently located in the vicinity 
of the Palais des Nations, the forum for much of the UN’s humanitarian 
work. Geneva is the center of gravity for the UN’s human rights bodies and 
their activities. The ICRC headquarters is a short walk from the Palais. A 
significant number of humanitarian NGOs maintain a presence in Geneva, 
including Save the Children International, one of the members of the Global 
Coalition. Save the Children’s Geneva office, headed by former Danish In-
ternational Development Minister Anita Bay, spearheaded the advocacy ef-
fort with the numerous State missions. As advocacy was pursued in Geneva, 
key GCPEA staff members (especially Sheppard, Erwin, and Aubert) en-
gaged in a substantial global effort involving numerous visits to State capitals 
in most regions to convince governments, their officials, and their militaries 
that the Guidelines made sense and deserved to be adopted.  
In Geneva, Bay’s efforts and those of her staff eventually led to the Nor-
wegian Mission in Geneva taking a close interest in the Guidelines. This 
came as a slight surprise to the author as the Norwegian Ministry of Defence 
had firmly declined an invitation to be involved in the drafting process be-
cause it believed such guidelines to be unnecessary given the existence of 












UN, Ambassador Steffen Kongstad (a veteran of the Oslo Convention on 
Cluster Munitions negotiations), took a different view, however. He seized 
the moment and also persuaded his Argentine colleague to add that State’s 
support. This engagement by Norway and Argentina transformed the cam-
paign. Between July 2013 and December 2014, the Draft Lucens Guidelines 
were transformed from a worthy civil society initiative into a serious candi-
date for substantial international endorsement.   
In being thus transformed, however, they ceased being merely a draft; 
their wording was slightly amended (although they remained the same in 
terms of substantive content), “Lucens” was dropped from their title, and 
the additional content of the GCPEA published document was eventually 
rejected in favor of a new document, the Safe Schools Declaration, drafted 
under Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs auspices. This declaration was 
to prove a most effective diplomatic “vehicle” in the international campaign 
to obtain broad State-level endorsement of the Guidelines. 
 
VII. THE CONTENT OF THE GUIDELINES 
 
What follows is the Guidelines’ final text, publicly launched under their cur-
rent title, at the UN Headquarters in Geneva on December 16, 2014.85 They 
were then incorporated in the Safe Schools Declaration and launched for-
mally at the inaugural Safe Schools Conference in Oslo in March 2015. Ex-
cept for Guideline 6 (which has to do with their promulgation and imple-
mentation), the Guidelines have a threefold purpose in providing tactical-
level guidance on the military use of education (Guidelines 1 and 2); attacks 
on educational facilities used by opposing forces (Guidelines 3 and 4); and 
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During an eight-hour rampage . . . a team of nine Taliban gunmen stormed through the 
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the defense and security of educational facilities (Guideline 5). The following 
is their text in full: 
 
Guideline 1: Functioning schools and universities should not be used by 
the fighting forces of parties to armed conflict in any way in support of the 
military effort.  
• This principle extends to schools and universities that are temporarily 
closed outside normal class hours, during weekends and holidays, and dur-
ing vacation periods.  
• Parties to armed conflict should neither use force nor offer incentives 
to education administrators to evacuate schools and universities in order 
that they can be made available for use in support of the military effort. 
 
Guideline 2: Schools and universities that have been abandoned or evacu-
ated because of the dangers presented by armed conflict should not be used 
by the fighting forces of parties to armed conflict for any purpose in sup-
port of their military effort, except in extenuating circumstances when they 
are presented with no viable alternative, and only for as long as no choice 
is possible between such use of the school or university and another feasi-
ble method for obtaining a similar military advantage. Other buildings 
should be regarded as better options and used in preference to school and 
university buildings, even if they are not so conveniently placed or config-
ured, except when such buildings are specially protected under Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (e.g. hospitals), and keeping in mind that parties 
to armed conflict must always take all feasible precautions to protect all 
civilian objects from attack.  
• Any such use of abandoned or evacuated schools and universities 
should be for the minimum time necessary.  
• Abandoned or evacuated schools and universities that are used by the 
fighting forces of parties to armed conflict in support of the military effort 
should remain available to allow educational authorities to re-open them as 
soon as practicable after fighting forces have withdrawn from them, pro-
vided this would not risk endangering the security of students and staff.  
• Any traces or indication of militarisation or fortification should be 
completely removed following the withdrawal of fighting forces, with every 
effort made to put right as soon as possible any damage caused to the in-
frastructure of the institution. In particular, all weapons, munitions and un-
exploded ordnance or remnants of war should be cleared from the site.  
 
Guideline 3: Schools and universities must never be destroyed as a measure 
intended to deprive the opposing parties to the armed conflict of the ability 












closed for the day or for holidays, evacuated or abandoned—are ordinarily 
civilian objects. 
 
Guideline 4: While the use of a school or university by the fighting forces 
of parties to armed conflict in support of their military effort may, depend-
ing on the circumstances, have the effect of turning it into a military objec-
tive subject to attack, parties to armed conflict should consider all feasible 
alternative measures before attacking them, including, unless circum-
stances do not permit, warning the enemy in advance that an attack will be 
forthcoming unless it ceases its use. 
• Prior to an attack on a school that has become a military objective, the 
parties to armed conflict should take into consideration the fact that chil-
dren are entitled to special respect and protection. An additional important 
consideration is the potential long-term negative effect on a community’s 
access to education posed by damage to or the destruction of a school. 
• The use of a school or university by the fighting forces of one party to 
a conflict in support of the military effort should not serve as justification 
for an opposing party that captures it to continue to use it in support of 
the military effort. As soon as feasible, any evidence or indication of mili-
tarisation or fortification should be removed and the facility returned to 
civilian authorities for the purpose of its educational function. 
 
Guideline 5: The fighting forces of parties to armed conflict should not be 
employed to provide security for schools and universities, except when al-
ternative means of providing essential security are not available. If possible, 
appropriately trained civilian personnel should be used to provide security 
for schools and universities. If necessary, consideration should also be 
given to evacuating children, students and staff to a safer location. If 
fighting forces are engaged in security tasks related to schools and univer-
sities, their presence within the grounds or buildings should be avoided if 
at all possible in order to avoid compromising the establishment’s civilian 
status and disrupting the learning environment. 
 
Guideline 6: All parties to armed conflict should, as far as possible and as 
appropriate, incorporate these Guidelines into, for example, their doctrine, 
military manuals, rules of engagement, operational orders, and other means 
of dissemination, to encourage appropriate practice throughout the chain 
of command. Parties to armed conflict should determine the most appro-














VIII. THE SAFE SCHOOLS DECLARATION 
 
This article is not about the Safe Schools Declaration as a whole, but about 
the Guidelines at its core. Nevertheless, it is certainly appropriate to offer 
some comment on the SSD because it has been crucial to the Guidelines’ 
success. Comment can be brief, however, not least because a full account of 
the process by which the SSD was drafted under Norwegian leadership is 
already available and readily accessible online.86  
Norway had been keen to project the Guidelines as part of a broader 
Norwegian initiative on the protection of education. Ambassador Konstad 
and his foreign ministry colleagues had been considering how best to project 
the Guidelines since Norway took on the lead role in advocacy in 2014. The 
bulk of the drafting effort for the SSD only occurred, however, after the 
Guidelines were launched at the UN in Geneva in December of that year. 
An intense process of negotiation and drafting was conducted in the first 
five months of 2015, finishing just in time for the Oslo Safe Schools Con-
ference at the end of May. By then, “ownership” of the Guidelines had ef-
fectively been transferred from GCPEA to Norway. To reflect this, the name 
had been changed, and reference to Lucens was removed.87 The additional 
material in the GCPEA document published in July 2013 was also dispensed 
with, leaving just the six guidelines for incorporation in the SSD.  
Significant effort under Norwegian auspices went into crafting the SSD 
around the Guidelines in early-2015. The Guidelines were the inspiration 
behind the SSD, which was drafted to accommodate them and which had 
no intended purpose separate from that. Nevertheless, the SSD became the 
only internationally agreed statement dedicated to the protection of educa-
tion in armed conflict. It is essentially an inter-governmental political docu-
ment that outlines a set of commitments to strengthen the protection of 
                                                                                                                      
86. See Reflections from the Safe Schools Declaration Process, supra note 10. Prepared by Richard 
Moyes, the managing director of Article36, who played an important role in developing the 
SSD. He had worked previously with Norwegian Ambassador Steffen Kongstad on the 
cluster munitions ban. Article36 is partly funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. 
87. The author resisted this at the time. By the summer of 2014, the Lucens Guidelines 
had gained a profile, certainly within Geneva, but also internationally. The author freely 
admits also that he was emotionally attached to the name, having personally founded the 
Lucens Roundtable and the subsequent drafting process was an intensely rewarding experi-
ence. The lesson here is to avoid at all costs allowing personal inclinations to cloud one’s 













education from attack and restrict the use of schools and universities for 
military purposes. It seeks to ensure the continuity of safe education during 
armed conflict and contains a series of statements that have attracted wide-
spread agreement.88  
The SSD has been critical to the success of the Guidelines. Without the 
SSD and the full force of State-level diplomacy led by Norway and partnered 
by Argentina, the Guidelines probably would have failed to achieve substan-
tial international endorsement. The text of the Guidelines and the SSD to-
gether have had a substantial impact internationally; therefore, viewed sepa-
rately, one suspects few would today be aware of either, each having been an 
essential partner for the other. 
The Oslo conference was the first of a series of biennial Safe Schools 
conferences, the highlight of which was a passionate address by Ziauddin 
Yousafzai, father of Malala Yousafzai. Oslo was followed in 2017 by Buenos 
Aires, hosted jointly by the Argentine foreign and defence ministries. In May 
2019, the Spanish government hosted the third Safe Schools Conference in 
Palma, Mallorca. As with the previous conferences, it attracted many State, 
UN, and civil society organization representatives, typically at ministerial and 
equivalent senior levels. Eighty States and all relevant UN agencies were for-
mally represented, as were over thirty NGOs. An indication of the degree of 
diplomatic and policy importance Spain attached to the conference was the 
presence of Her Majesty Queen Letizia, who also delivered the closing ad-
dress. The fourth Safe Schools Conference is due to take place in 2021, 
hosted by Nigeria. 
Each of these conferences has been accompanied by a round of focused 
diplomatic effort to encourage further States to endorse the SSD. One fea-
ture of their proceedings has been formal State announcements to that ef-
fect. Beyond the conferences, some of the State endorsements have been at 
the highest level. In February 2017, for example, French endorsement was 
announced personally by President Hollande during the opening session of 
the Protect Children from War inter-ministerial conference co-organized by 
France and UNICEF. The French decision came after several months of 
advocacy efforts by UNICEF, HRW, and Save the Children.89 The author 
                                                                                                                      
88. For the full text, see Safe Schools Declaration, supra note 1. 
89. See France: Positive Move to Protect Schools, HRW (Feb. 21, 2017), https:// www.hrw. 
org/news/2017/02/21/france-positive-move-protect-schools. The effort to persuade 
France to endorse included a visit to Paris by the author and his Save the Children (UK) 
colleague Veronique Aubert for valuable discussions with French government officials in 












was much involved in attempts to obtain UK endorsement, with differences 
of opinion between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Depart-
ment for International Development, on the one hand, and the Ministry of 
Defence, on the other. United Kingdom endorsement required a cross-gov-
ernment agreement, which was only arrived at in 2018, allowing then Foreign 
Secretary Boris Johnson to announce UK endorsement during the Com-
monwealth Heads of Government Conference in London.90 Throughout the 
period since 2015, GCPEA and its leading members have worked to advance 
the cause of the SSD. In-country representatives of UNICEF, Save the Chil-
dren, and HRW, in particular, have continued their work to persuade gov-
ernments of the value of the SSD and the Guidelines.91 Sheppard, Aubert, 
and Neff have also been heavily engaged in advocacy visits globally. The 
process has been strongly supported within the UN, with the previous and 
current Special Representative to the Secretary-General for Children in 
Armed Conflict (Leila Zerrougui and Virginia Gamba) both personally com-
mitted to advancing the cause of the SSD and the Guidelines, including 
through regular mention of them during UN Security Council open debates 
(the most recent held on September 10, 2020).92 Another strong supporter 
has been former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, currently UN Special 
Envoy on Global Education. He was an early advocate of the Lucens Guide-
lines, urging their endorsement in 2014, shortly after it was announced that 
Norway would be leading advocacy at the State level.93 Since then, Norway’s 
diplomatic leadership and the SSD’s significance have been crucial in the 
                                                                                                                      
90. The campaign in the United Kingdom took longer than the author imagined it 
would, with significant opposition to the Guidelines from elements within the Ministry of 
Defence. Even a personal exchange of letters between the author and Prime Minister David 
Cameron (who happened to be the author’s Member of Parliament) failed to have the de-
sired effect.  
91. The author has worked closely with Save the Children colleagues on this advocacy, 
in particular paying visits to West Africa, NATO Headquarters, Japan, and Ukraine, and 
also with Save the Children (UK) to persuade the British government to endorse (finally 
achieved when then British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson announced UK endorsement 
during the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in London in 2019). 
92. For a recording of that debate, see Open Debate, supra note 5. More generally, see 
Children and Armed Conflict, UNITED NATIONS, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/ 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2021). 
93. See The Office of the UN Special Envoy for Global Education, https://educationen-
voy.org/what-we-do/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2021); see also Gordon Brown, Opinion, We Must 
Ensure Places of Education Are Never Targeted in Conflicts, GUARDIAN (July 27, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/27/schools-never-targeted-












advocacy efforts. The undoubted success of the Guidelines has been sub-
stantially delivered as a result of their incorporation within the SSD.   
 
IX. IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING 
 
The sixth and final guideline focuses on how the Guidelines as a whole might 
be promulgated by States and ANSAs for application by their military forces. 
It was always considered vital for the Guidelines to be concise, clearly stated, 
and capable of being promulgated in ways that military forces could readily 
comprehend.  
In producing the discussion document for the Lucens Roundtable, the 
author had included draft ROE developed around the Guidelines’ text as a 
potential means of applying them. The promulgation of ROE is an im-
portant, widely used operational mechanism, particularly by Western militar-
ies, to ensure that tactical action is consistent with the military campaign’s 
strategic objective. Rules of engagement are a command and control mech-
anism, whose content is determined by high-level commanders (and, ulti-
mately, political decision-makers), to restrict subordinate commanders’ ac-
tions at the tactical level to those consistent with the strategic purpose. It is 
worth adding that, while ROE should be legally reviewed in the drafting and 
promulgation processes to avoid any manifest illegality, it is a common mis-
perception that they are a watertight means of ensuring legal compliance at 
the tactical level. They most certainly are not; a defense that one complied 
with the ROE is no defense to a breach of the law.  
In the Lucens discussion document, the author employed a format based 
on generic ROE compiled under the auspices of the International Institute 
for Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy.94 While the example ROE in-
cluded were intended as a suitable aid to promulgation and implementation, 
the dominant feeling of those present in Lucens was that the eventual ver-
sion of the Guidelines should avoid being too prescriptive in relation to in-
ternal promulgation. It was argued convincingly that even the suggestion of 
reliance on ROE could be off-putting rather than encouraging, especially to 
States and ANSAs that did not ordinarily employ such a sophisticated com-
mand and control mechanism. While ROE were not entirely inappropriate, 
they were but one means of applying the Guidelines. As the sixth guideline 
eventually went on to state: “doctrine, military manuals, rules of engagement, 
                                                                                                                      













operational orders, and other means of dissemination, [are all potential ways] 
to encourage appropriate practice throughout the chain of command.” It 
was to be left to individual States and ANSAs—and their military forces—
to determine for themselves their most appropriate means of promulgation. 
While the Guidelines themselves were not prescriptive, GCPEA has 
since provided a great deal of advice and guidance to assist all States and 
ANSAs in their approaches to their incorporation in military processes. 
Training is, of course, vital in this context. The mention of “doctrine” in 
Guideline 6 is especially pertinent here. The definition of doctrine is “that 
which is taught”—military doctrine is fundamental to military training. With 
this in mind, in 2017, GCPEA published two documents to inform both the 
development of policy on protecting schools and the training to be provided 
to militaries likely to be operating in conflict zones: The Safe Schools Dec-
laration: A Framework for Action95 and Implementing the Guidelines: A 
Toolkit to Guide Understanding and Implementation.96 The latter was pro-
duced for the Global Coalition by the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initia-
tive, the Canadian-based organization hosted by Dalhousie University and 
set up in 2007 by General Dallaire (who had commanded the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda, during the 1994 Rwanda genocide).97  
HRW, Save the Children, and GCPEA have trained personnel from 
armed forces and police forces on the Guidelines. This has included training 
under UNDPKO auspices for military forces forming part of UN peace-
keeping operations. Save the Children successfully advocated for the military 
use of schools and attacks on education to be included in NATO training 
scenarios. The ICRC has offered technical advice to all interested parties re-
garding how they might best implement the SSD and the Guidelines in spe-
cific contexts.98  
                                                                                                                      
95. GLOBAL COALITION TO PROTECT EDUCATION FROM ATTACK, THE SAFE 
SCHOOLS DECLARATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, http://protectingeducation.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/documents/documents_a_framework_for_action.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2021). 
96. GLOBAL COALITION TO PROTECT EDUCATION FROM ATTACK, IMPLEMENTING 
THE GUIDELINES: A TOOLKIT TO GUIDE UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
http://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/documents_toolkit.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2021).  
97. See THE DALLAIRE INITIATIVE: STRATEGIC PLAN 2019–2020, DALHOUSIE UNI-
VERSITY, https://dallaireinstitute.org/ wp-content / uploads / 2020 / 01 /RDCSI_strate-
gic_plan-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2021). 












While States are obvious participants in the Safe Schools process, with 
the ability to formally endorse it through registration with the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is vitally important to recognize also the im-
portance of ANSA involvement, including in the implementation of the 
Guidelines. The NGO Geneva Call was involved in the drafting process 
from the outset, which ensured that the Guidelines contained nothing that 
would be a generic barrier to ANSA action in support. The draft was dis-
cussed with ANSAs at Geneva Call’s third meeting of signatories in late 
2014, at which participating ANSAs agreed to consider the Guidelines. The 
author spoke at that meeting and was subsequently invited by Geneva Call 
to contribute to IHL/LOAC training for ANSA fighters, during which he 
provided sessions on the Guidelines and how they could be implemented by 
ANSAs during armed conflict. Geneva Call noted that the Guidelines “rep-
resent a new way to engage with ANSAs, starting first with the less conten-
tious issue of military use of schools, then moving to ‘harder’ issues like child 
recruitment and sexual violence.”99 
The monitoring of promulgation and implementation is now a perma-
nent process, with Global Coalition members playing an important role in 
collecting data on the protection of schools during armed conflicts. Those 
NGOs, such as Save the Children and HRW, that deploy into armed conflict 
States, as well as relevant UN agencies, are fundamentally important sources 
of data relating to implementation. The biennial Safe Schools conferences 
also provide an opportunity for endorsing States to report on any actions 
they have taken themselves consistent with their commitment to the Guide-
lines. Advocacy in relation to the Guidelines focused initially on obtaining 
State endorsement of the SSD; increasingly now it has to concentrate on 
ensuring behavior is shifting in favor of protecting educational facilities from 
military use. Fortunately, there is increasing evidence that the SSD and the 





                                                                                                                      
99. See PROTECT EDUCATION IN INSECURITY AND CONFLICT, REPORT: PEIC/GE-
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X. THE IMPACT OF THE SSD AND GUIDELINES 
 
In October 2019, GCPEA published a report on the practical impact of the 
SSD.100 This report was based on data provided principally by UN agencies, 
NGOs, the media, and States. Most of the data was made available at the 
2019 Safe Schools Conference in Palma. The reporting period extended 
from the launch of the SSD in May 2015 to the end of 2018, with the report 
structured under four headings: “Downward Trends in Incidents of Military 
Use of Schools”; “Heightened International Standards on Military Use of 
Schools”; “Increased Protection of Schools from Military Use in National 
Policy and Practice”; and “Increased Dialogue and Engagement, Particularly 
with Military Actors, Regarding Protecting Schools.”101 
The overall reported incidents of military use of schools and universities 
had declined between 2015 and 2018 in those States that had both endorsed 
the SSD in 2015 and experienced armed conflict during the same period. 
These were Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Kenya, Leba-
non, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Su-
dan. (It is important to note that this data capture concentrated on States 
that had endorsed the SSD/Guidelines in 2015 and, for that reason, neither 
Syria nor Yemen were included in the survey.102) Overall, reported incidents 
had halved, from around 160 in 2015 to just over eighty by 2018. The de-
crease was admittedly not as dramatic in all of those States. In both Palestine 
and Sudan, for example, reported incidents remained at about the same level 
throughout the period. In Kenya, Lebanon, and Mozambique, incidents 
were so few and infrequent that no reliable conclusion was possible but, in 
Niger, incidents increased. Despite this, the overall figures were most en-
couraging. Of course, it is impossible to prove, beyond doubt, the existence 
of a direct link between the endorsement of the SSD/Guidelines and reduc-
tions in incidents of both military use and attacks on education 
                                                                                                                      
100. See Fact Sheet: Practical Impact of the Safe Schools Declaration, supra note 12. The Fact 
Sheet is extensively referenced to sources, which it is not thought necessary to repeat here. 
101. Id. at 1–3.  
102. Yemen did endorse the SSD in October 2017, however, and in 2019 the Group 
of Experts on Yemen informed the Human Rights Council that “sources reported that the 
Yemeni armed forces have commenced to withdraw from some schools as per the commit-
ments taken under the Safe Schools Declaration.” See Group of Eminent International and 
Regional Experts on Yemen, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses 
since September 2014, ¶ 722, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/CRP.1 (Sept. 3, 2019). The Yemeni Min-













establishments. Arguably, this will never be possible, but the balance of 
probability seems to suggest such a link.  
In June 2015, a month after the launch of the SSD, and again in July 
2018, the UN Security Council encouraged all member States “to take con-
crete measures to deter . . . use of schools by armed forces and armed 
groups.”103 By the time of the launch, UNDPKO had already developed a 
child protection policy banning the use of educational facilities by peace-
keepers.104 Forces on UN operations today are under an obligation to pro-
mote and adhere to the Guidelines; GCPEA has stated that there have been 
no reported incidents of UN military forces using schools or universities 
since early 2017.  
The Lucens Guidelines had been presented to the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child in June 2013. Since then, UN treaty bodies have made 
frequent recommendations on strengthening protections for schools from 
military use. These had focused on sixteen States in all, including the Central 
African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, and Thai-
land.  
The remainder of the GCPEA report contains a wealth of detail on the 
development of States’ policy and practice, as well as examples of increased 
dialogue with military actors from both States and ANSAs. It is not necessary 
to repeat in full all of that detailed evidence to convey the fact that the SSD 
and the Guidelines have achieved a remarkable international profile in the 
five years since their launch in Oslo in 2015. Nevertheless, and paraphrasing 
the GCPEA report, the following provides a flavor of that profile: 
• In 2018 alone, the Global Coalition and its member organizations 
conducted over 120 advocacy meetings with State representatives of more 
than seventy-five States in Geneva, New York, Brussels, Addis Ababa, and 
various national capitals. Even when States do not endorse the SSD, the 
meetings result in officials being briefed about attacks on education facilities 
and personnel and cause them to engage with the SSD and the Guidelines 
contained therein.  
                                                                                                                      
103. S.C. Res. 2225, ¶ 7 (June 18, 2015).  
104. When the author first became engaged with GCPEA in late 2011, he discussed 
military use of schools with a Geneva colleague who had previously served at the special 
representative of the Secretary-General level within UN peacekeeping operations. He con-
firmed that UN peacekeepers had routinely used abandoned schools for UN force purposes 
during his time in Africa. The author’s own witness to UNAMSIL’s use of a school in Sierra 












• The SSD has been highlighted during a number of UN Security 
Council open debates on the protection of civilians, on children and armed 
conflict, and on women, peace, security, and at meetings of the Human 
Rights Council. The Global Coalition estimates that around fifty States de-
livered approximately 230 individual statements in these contexts positively 
referencing the SSD between 2017 and 2019.  
• High-level UN officials have frequently expressed support for the 
SSD/Guidelines. They include Secretary-General António Guterres (who 
urged all States to endorse the SSD/Guidelines in his 2018 and 2019 annual 
reports on Children and Armed Conflict); the Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Virginia Gamba (who reg-
ularly calls for endorsement of the SSD/Guidelines and conducts bilateral 
advocacy with States to encourage endorsement and implementation); and 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein (who 
recommended endorsement in his report on Protecting the Rights of the 
Child in Humanitarian Settings).   
• The African Union’s Peace and Security Council welcomed the 
SSD/Guidelines, urged all African Union member States to endorse and 
strengthen support for the Guidelines, and called on members to “comply 
with International Humanitarian Law and ensure that schools are not used 
for military purposes.”105 
• In its first “Education in Emergencies” policy communication, the 
European Commission voiced support for the SSD/Guidelines, announced 
that the EU “will support initiatives to promote and roll out the SSD,” and 
acknowledged that military use of schools increases violence in educational 
settings, negatively affecting access to education.106 
For the future, the intention currently is for a Safe Schools conference 
to be held every two years, hosted by endorsing States from different regions. 
So far, European and Latin American States have hosted conferences, and 
Nigeria will host the 2021 conference. These conferences have been a great 
boost for advocacy, with States in attendance announcing new endorsements 
of the SSD. In the future, the agenda focus will increasingly be on endorsing 
                                                                                                                      
105. See Press Release, African Union, Press Statement of the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) at its 597th meeting on the theme: “Children in 
Armed Conflicts in Africa with particular focus on protecting schools from attacks dur-
ing armed conflict,” Press Statement PSC/PR/BR (DXCVII) (May 10, 2016). 
106. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises, COM 












States’ reports on what they have done to implement the Guidelines. There 
will also be independent reports from NGOs and UN agencies on military 
use during current armed conflicts.  
 
XI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
The account of the Guidelines related in this article is an undoubted success 
story. When the author sat down to draft the initial version prior to the Lu-
cens Roundtable in 2012, he most certainly did not imagine that the eventual 
text would be endorsed by over a hundred States and cause the UN to de-
clare an annual day of reflection on the need to protect schools from attack. 
At the heart of the success story are the Guidelines themselves, whose text 
has been persuasive and convincing to those government officials who have 
recommended its endorsement. Those words would not have been possible 
without the input of all who attended the formative meetings in Geneva and 
Lucens and who contributed to the research and review process in 2013. Yet, 
the Guidelines, good as they were, would not have gained acceptance if they 
had not been taken up with enthusiasm by the members of the Global Coa-
lition and by key people working tirelessly to achieve greater protection for 
schools and universities and for the children and staff who occupy them. In 
turn, their efforts would surely not have delivered the results outlined if it 
had not been for enthusiastic leadership at the State level by Norway, in part-
nership with Argentina, whose missions in Geneva spearheaded the interna-
tional diplomatic campaign. There was clear momentum generated by the 
Oslo Safe Schools Conference in 2015 and maintained through the subse-
quent conferences in Buenos Aires and Palma. The Guidelines were well 
packaged within the Safe Schools Declaration, the combination of the two 
amounting to a form of diplomatic symbiosis. Despite all of these positive 
features of the story, however, what has more than anything else been re-
sponsible for the success of the Guidelines has been the profoundly unfor-
tunate situations in which children and their teachers find themselves in the 
never-ending series of wars that blight international society. It is a matter of 
profound regret that the Guidelines are considered necessary.   
 
